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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SPECIFIC RESTITUTION OF THE TITLE TO LAND UPON FAILURE
OF CONSIDERATION IN A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND
The term restitution has been defined as a means by which a party is restored of something received by another.1 The concept generally refers to the
restoration of money value, rather than the return of a specific thing. Whereas
the purpose of the remedy in damages for breach of contract is to put the injured party in the position he would have been in had the contract been fully
put the injured party
performed, the purpose of the remedy in restitution is to
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The courts rarely discuss restitution in connection with contracts for the
sale of land. Cancellation of the deed, which is an equitable remedy, is the terminology most often employed by the courts. 3 The practical effect of cancellation, however, is the restoration of title in the property to the grantor. Cancellation of a deed, therefore, must be discussed in conjunction with restitution.
In general, the courts have been rather reluctant in granting restitution to
the grantor for failure of consideration in contracts for the sale of land.4 In
Ware v. Shartle,5 the court exemplified this view by stating:
Where the grantor accepts the grantee's promise to perform certain
acts, without specifically providing in the deed that failure to perform
shall work a forfeiture, affect the validity of the deed, or entitle him to
a reconveyance of the realty, equity will not ordinarily set aside the
deed for a failure of consideration. 6
In City of Cleveland v. Herron,j the plaintiff agreed to sell certain land to
the municipality, the City of Cleveland. In consideration for the conveyance, the
City was to make a payment of $3,000 coupled with a promise to improve the
land "as rapidly as possible." Although the City paid the $3,000, it failed to

make rapid improvements upon the land pursuant to the agreement. Due to the
partial failure of consideration, the plaintiff instituted an action to cancel the
1 Fineg v. Pickrell, 81 Ariz. 313, 305 P.2d 455 (1956) ; 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1107
(1964).
2 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1104 (1964); Crofoot Lumber, Inc. v. Thompson, 163 Cal.
App. 2d 324, 329 P.2d 302 (3d Dist. 1958).
8 Owens v. Ridgeway, 395 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
4 5 Williston on Contracts § 1456 (Rev. ed. 1937); 6 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
and Equitable Remedies § 686 (3d. ed. 1905). See also Burgess v. Hatton, 209 S.W.2d 799
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948), where the court said, "Want or failure of consideration is in
itself ordinarily no grounds for the voidance of an executed deed." Accord, Hewett v.
Dole, 69 Wash. 163, 124 P. 374 (1912) ; Foster v. Flack, 140 Wis. 48, 121 N.W. 890 (1909);
Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S.C. 271, 94 S.E. 19 (1917).
5 59 Ohio L. Abs. 156, 94 N.E.2d 579 (1948).
6 Id. at 157, 94 N.E.2d at 580.
7 102 Ohio St. 218, 131 N.E. 489 (1921).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

deed. In denying the requested relief, the court said that cancellation of a deed
will not be ordered for a "mere breach of contract."
In New Orleans Great Northern R. Co. v. Belhaven Heights Co., s the court
refused to cancel a deed upon the total failure of consideration. There, the plaintiff conveyed a tract of land in consideration for the defendant's promise to construct a railroad which would enhance the value of the plaintiff's adjoining
property. Upon the defendant's failure to perform, the plaintiff sought cancellation of the deed. The court in denying relief said:
The grantor in a general warranty deed cannot maintain a bill in
equity for cancellation on account of a mere failure of the grantee to
perform a promise forming in whole or in part the consideration. 9
These decisions are in conformity with the general view that courts will not
ordinarily cancel a deed when there is other compensatory relief available. The
grantor may always maintain an action for damages for the breach of contract.
Courts have also expressed the fear that cancellation of deeds upon a failure of
consideration would cause much uncertainty in the validity of deeds with severe
adverse effects in real estate transactions. 10
FRAUD IN THE EXECUTION

When fraud occurs in the execution of a contract, the court of equity will
exercise jurisdiction and cancel the grantor's deed." An excellent example of
this exception is illustrated in Nathoo v. Jones.12 In that case, the plaintiff's husband introduced her to a prospective purchaser of her property. The plaintiff
was shown a contract for the sale of land upon terms agreeable to her and she

signed the purported agreement. She later learned that she had in fact signed
a deed. An action was instituted to cancel the deed based on the fact that the
grantee had switched the contract with the deed and thereby gained title to the
property by fraud in the execution. The court held that the plaintiff stated proper
grounds for equitable relief.
There is, however, a manifest difference between fraud in the execution of
a contract and failure of consideration.' 8 Whereas fraud in the execution implies
that the contract is void from the inception, failure of consideration implies that
14
a consideration which originally was sufficient has ceased to exist.
8 122 Miss. 190, 84 So. 178 (1920).

9 Id. at 209, 84 So. at 180.
10 Lawrence v. Gayetty, 78 Cal. 126, 20 P. 382 (1889).
11 Steiner v. Steiner, 160 Cal. App. 2d 665, 325 P.2d 109 (2d Dist. 1958) ; C.I.T. Corporation v. Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 (1942).
12 111 Kan. 406, 207 P. 645 (1922).
18 Plummer v. Bradford, 395 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
14 Douglass v. Douglass, 199 Okla. 519, 188 P.2d 221 (1947).
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CONDITION SUBSEQUENT

A second area in which a grantor may be restored of his real estate is upon
the occurrence of a condition subsequent. In Salamanca Trust Co. v. Crouse,15
one Neltson Widrig conveyed certain land by deed to one Maggie Rowan in consideration for the grantee's promise to care for the grantor for the remainder of
his life. The deed provided that in case of interruption of these services for any
reason whatsoever, the grant would become void and the title would revert to the
grantor and his heirs. When Mrs. Rowan died, Widrig re-entered and conveyed
the premises to the plaintiff who brought this action to remove the cloud on the
title. The defendants, the heirs of Mrs. Rowan, made a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the grantee's services were interrupted owing to
an act of God. The court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff because of the
occurrence of a condition subsequent in the deed which created a right in the
grantor to re-enter.
In Parsons v. Smilie,16 the paintiff conveyed certain land to the defendant.
The deed contained a clause whereby the grantor was given a right of re-entry
if the grantee failed to maintain the premises as a lumber yard for five years.
The need for lumber decreased and the grantee discontinued using the property
for such purposes. In upholding the plaintiff's right to re-enter, the court stated
that the damages in this action were unascertainable.
From these two decisions, it is apparent that the courts will allow rights of
re-entry provided, however, there is a clause in the deed permitting such action
on the occurrence of a condition subsequent.
EXCHANGE OF LAND

A contract which requires an exchange of land is a third area in which the
court has recognized an exception and has ordered a cancellation of the injured
party's deed. In Piper v. Queeny,17 the defendant, who was planning to build a
garage, found it necessary to purchase a portion of adjoining land which was
owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was willing to convey the needed portion of
his land to the defendant in exchange for a section of the defendant's property.
Upon the defendant's failure to deliver a deed, the court granted the plaintiff's
prayer for cancellation of his deed.
In Simpson v. Bostwick,i8 a more recent decision, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement for an exchange of property. The plaintiff
agreed to convey his farm in consideration for the defendant's promise to pay
the plaintiff $2,500 immediately and to deliver title to his trailer court to the
129 Misc. 609, 222 N.Y.S. 83 (1927).
16 97 Cal. 647, 32 P. 702 (1893).
17 282 Pa. 135, 127 A. 474 (1925).
18 248 Ia. 238, 80 N.W2d 339 (1957). Accord, Olsen v. Sortedahl, 143 Ia. 166, 121
N.W. 559 (1909).
15
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plaintiff within one year. The defendant also agreed that if he was unable to convey title to the trailer court within the one-year limitation, the $2,500 was to constitute a rental of the farm. The court ordered a cancellation of the plaintiff's
deed upon the failure of the defendant to fulfill his promises.
Although the courts have not mentioned the basis for this exception, it is
readily apparent that the remedy in damages for breach of contract is inadequate. If a grantor conveys land for a consideration other than an exchange of
realty, monetary damages are generally adequate. This is proper because the
grantor is bargaining for money or something which can be compensated by
monetary damages. In an exchange of land situation, however, the injured party
cannot be properly compensated by damages because each piece of property is
unique.
GRANTEE'S PROMISE TO SUPPORT THE GRANTOR

In Lockwood v. Lockwood, 19 the plaintiff, a seventy-year old widow, conveyed fifty acres of land to her son, the defendant, who had always lived with
her. The transfer was made upon his promise to maintain and support his mother
for the remainder of her life. When the defendant breached his promise by compelling his mother to leave the premises, she instituted an action requesting that
the deed be cancelled. In holding for the plaintiff, the court stated that cancellation was a proper remedy because the consideration had completely failed.
The court, in Martinez v. Martinez,20 recognized this exception and said:
Where an aged person conveys all of his property to another in consideration for a promise b the gantee to support the grantor for life,
and if the grantee fails to keep this promise or perform the agreement,
a court of equity will grant relief by rescinding the contract, setting
of the property, without
aside the deed, and ordering a reconveyance
21
the necessity of alleging or proving fraud.
The reason for this deviation from the majority rule is essentially the same
as that mentioned in the exchange of realty exception. If an elderly person has
transferred all of his property for a promise by the grantee to support him for
life, an action in damages for a breach of contract is generally inadequate. Under
22
these circumstances, cancellation of the deed is the only adequate remedy.
Some courts have reached the same result by basing the cancellation of the
deed upon the concept of fraud. 23 In Stebbins v. Petty, 24 the plaintiff conveyed
land to one Emily Petty in consideration for her promise that she, her heirs and
19 124 Mich. 627, 83 N.W. 613 (1900).
20 57 Colo. 292, 141 P. 469 (1914).
21 Id. at 298, 141 P. at 471.
22 Pressey v. Heath, 35 NJ. Super. 346, 114 A.2d 16 (1955).
23 Frazier v. Miller, 16 IMI.48 (1854); Oard v. Oard, 59 I. 46 (1871); Fabrice v.
Von Der Brelie, 190 Il. 460, 60 N.E. 835 (1901); McClelland v. McClelland, 176 111. 83,
51 N.E. 559 (1898) ; O'Ferrall v. O'Ferrall, 276 Ill. 132, 114 N.E. 685 (1916).
24 209 Ill. 291? 70 N.E. 673 (1904).
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her assigns would support and maintain the grantor for the remainder of his life.
Mrs. Petty began fulfilling her agreement but died within three months. Thereafter her husband and her children refused to continue to support and maintain
the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was denied his request for cancellation of the
deed, the court seemed to intimate that under different circumstances such relief
would be ordered. The court stated:
The cancellation by courts of equity of deeds executed in consideration
of the agreement of the grantee to support the grantor, on the grantee's
failure to perform, is based on the theory that the grantee's refusal
to comply with the contract raises a presumption that he did not intend
it in the first instance, making the contract fraudulent
to comply with 25
in its inception.
In Rhode Island, the courts advance a trust theory in these situations. In
Grant v. Bell, 26 the plaintiff brought an action seeking reconveyance of a lot of
land held by the defendant who had failed to perform his promise to support the
grantor. In concluding that the legal remedy was inadequate owing to the fact
that a continuing obligation to support could cause a multiplicity of suits, the
court imposed a constructive trust on the property in favor of the grantee.
CONCLUSION

The courts have been reluctant to grant restitution of the title to land upon
failure of consideration. The prevailing view is that an aggrieved party can be
adequately compensated in damages. Where, however, there has been a fraud in
the execution of the contract, a promise by the grantee to support the grantor,
a contract for an exchange of land, or an occurrence of a condition subsequent
in a deed the courts have concluded that the remedy of money damages is not
adequate and have permitted the grantor to, regain title to his land. Outside of
these four basic exceptions the law is relatively well-established and the injured
party has been denied the equitable remedy of cancellation of the deed of conveyance.
PRESTON K. JOHNSON

Id. at 293, 70 N.E. at 673.
26 26 R.L 288, 58 A. 951 (1904).
25

